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1. Introduction
Countertrade [1] has become big business [2]. Eastern European countries
have long favored such transactions as a means of trading with the West for
desired commodities and technology in the absence of convertible currency [3].
With its recent entrance into trade with the West, the People's Republic of
China (the "PRC") has expressed a similar interest in countertrade [4]. Third
World nations have also increased their reliance on countertrade in order to
utilize available commodities [5], rather than expending scarce cash, to pay for
purchases, while at the same time tying Western suppliers to continued support
of their technical development.
The success of many countertrade agreements and the continued volatility
of currencies and high interest rates indicate that countertrade deals will
continue to grow in number and importance, particularly in trade with the
East. From the point of view of U.S. firms, countertrade has several attrac-
tions. It allows them: (1) to sell goods or services in the foreign market, where
buyers claim that they lack other resources to pay for purchases; (2) to develop
long-term associations with foreign buyers who, in turn, serve as local pro-
ducers or distributors, thereby excluding Western competitors from the foreign
market; and (3) to license technology, often already thoroughly exploited in
the West, with access to the licensee's operations or output. should that be
desired.
Despite these advantages, critics have argued that countertrade transactions
may be less efficient than cash sales [6]. This article, however, assumes that the
phenomenon of countertrade will grow due to its attractiveness to the par-
ticipants, even when their interests are not identical with national policies of
resource allocation [7]. In addition, this article assumes that the United States
has valid reasons for promoting exports. Therefore, it proposes that the
government should initiate, and, if necessary, operate a program for insuring
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U.S. participants in, countertrade transactions. This insurance would protect
exporters against political risks arising from acts of the U.S. Government that
threaten these transactions. No separate program need be created to insure
countertrade deals against the risks of acts by foreign governments; such
insurance is, to some degree, presently available through the Export-Import
Bank (the "Ex-Im Bank") [8].
2. The unique risks of countertrade
A countertrade transaction may be a simple barter deal. For example,
aircraft made in the United States may be sold by a manufacturer to the
government airline of Yugoslavia, in exchange for a quantity of Yugoslavia
hams [9]. In such a transaction the time-span over which the parties perform
their obligations may be brief, and the risk of adverse U.S. political actions
disrupting the exchange would be relatively minor.
Such transactions may, however, require much longer commitments. The
U.S. firm may be involved in the delivery and assembly of the aircraft over
several months, the delivery of spare parts for many years, and the supply of
technical services to train maintenance personnel and to provide safety and
other improvements on a continuing basis. On the other side, the foreign
purchaser may have contracted to ship products over several harvests. In these
cases, U.S. export or import restraints may be imposed on the merchandise or
services, moving in either direction, well before the entire deal is completed
[10].
Most countertrade transactions are, in fact, long-term; this is particularly
true of agreements to construct plants employing technology acquired in the
West. Such transactions often involve the transfer abroad of technology and
the provision of training and services during the years of construction and
startup. Payments are partially made from the output of the facilities built, and
these transactions may require 10 to 20 years to complete. The Occidental
Petroleum transaction with the U.S.S.R. [11] is an example of such extended
countertrade. Occidental exported technology to the U.S.S.R. in exchange for
shipments of ammonia. The initial shipment of ammonia occurred five years
after the contract was signed. The shipments were to continue during the next
20 years.
The Occidental case illustrates the high risk of long-term countertrade.
Occidental faced the loss of payments from the U.S.S.R. due to actions
initiated by U.S. competitors [12] to limit or prevent Occidental's receipt of
payment. It is important to recognize that the Occidental situation may not
differ from other long-term import relatiofiships where expectations are
jeopardized by a competitor's invocation of the unfair trade laws. Thus, a U.S.
company that invests substantially in establishing a domestic sales network for
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the U.S. distribution of a foreign product, pursuant to a long-term sales
contract, may fairly argue that it too faces similar risks. Its investment may be
jeopardized by competitors seeking U.S. Government imposed import re-
straints [131.
A difference does exist, however, in the countertrade context. In a counter-
trade transaction the importer is also furthering a goal of the U.S. Government
- increased exports. The countertrading firms may, therefore, have a better
claim to protection against the risk of government reaction to imports. The
claim may be especially strong when the government has promoted and often
insured the initial exports.
Another risk to countertrade transactions lies in the requirement for export
licences. The Department of Commerce's Office of Export Administration
must issue a validated export licence before a U.S. firm may export commodi-
ties or technology to the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (the "CMEA")
countries [14] and the PRC. A U.S. supplier or its foreign affiliates may face
the sudden revocation of a licence for political reasons quite beyond the firm's
control. For example, in 1982 the U.S. Government revoked Dresser In-
dustries' licence to export compressors to the U.S.S.R. because of political
controversy over the Siberian pipeline [15]. While not publicly described as a
countertrade transaction, Dresser raises the question of whether a company
that received a licence, produced the goods, and was prepared to deliver them
should be afforded the opportunity of acquiring protection against licence
revocation for U.S. Government purposes.
Insurance issued by the U.S. Government could protect U.S. companies
involved in countertrade transactions. Otherwise, the two greatest risks -
competitor invocation of the U.S. unfair trade laws and revocation of U.S.
export licences due to political disputes - may inhibit valuable countertrade
deals.
3. Existing U.S. Government insurance programs
The principle that the U.S. Government should offer insurance to its
nationals engaged in activities beneficial to the economy is hardly new. At the
close of fiscal year 1979, the U.S. Government had issued insurance commit-
ments in excess of $2 trillion; over $276 billion had been issued in loan
guarantees [16]. These figures are largely off-budget because the published
federal budget only indicates modest premium collections and claims paid by
on-budget agencies. The government has protected citizens engaged in a
variety of activities [171, insuring against defaults or disasters in the absence of
commercially available protection of similar scope and affordable cost. Such
programs are a relatively inexpensive and effective way of promoting public
welfare [18].
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In like manner, insurance may be a further incentive and a necessary
protection to U.S. exports in the area of international trade. Three existing
programs may serve as useful models on which to base a plan of countertrade
insurance.
3.1. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (" OPIC ")
OPIC was created as a government-owned corporation in 1969 to encourage
private participation in the transfer of resources by developing Third World
nations [19]. OPIC offers U.S. investors insurance against certain types of
political risks which are particularly acute in lesser developed countries
("LDCs"): (1) inconvertibility of foreign currency that is received as profit or
as a return of the initial investment; (2) expropriation, including the repudia-
tion of contracts; and (3) war, rebellion, or insurrection ("WRI"). Additional
insurance is also available for mineral projects that may be adversely affected
by host government breaches of contract. This insurance may also include the
consequential losses caused by the closing of operations for at least six months
through acts of war or insurrection. Over $3 billion of this insurance was
written by OPIC in fiscal year 1982 [20], a marked increase from fiscal year
1981.
The scope and limits of the OPIC program need to be understood. First,
OPIC insurance is only available for investments in a "less developed friendly
country" with which the President of the United States has agreed to institute
a program for insurance [21]. Thus, investments in the CMEA countries are
ineligible for protection. Second, the insurance is solely aimed at investments
in a foreign country and does not cover trade transactions. Third, the current
maximum amount of insurance that OPIC can issue is $7.5 billion, with
individual policies subject to a variety of other limitations. Fourth, most OPIC
insurance covers only 90% of the loss sustained; a 10% co-insurance risk must
be retained by the investor. To receive payment, the investor must assign his
entire interest in the claim to OPIC. Finally, there is uncertainty over OPIC's
very existence over the long term, due to changes in political attitudes [22].
Premiums for protection under OPIC vary depending on the type of
investment, the country, the size of the project, and whether the initial
investment or the future profits are also sought to be insured. Expropriation
protection for an entire investment is likely to cost no more than 1% of the
investment. The Office of Management and Budget has adopted a principle
that all federal loan guarantee fees and premiums should permit recovery of all
costs associated with the program [23]. Such actuarial accuracy, however, may
be difficult to calculate for political risks associated with countertrade [24].
For the present discussion, the important point is that OPIC, an agency of
the U.S. Government, exists to insure U.S. investors against the risk of political
decisions made by foreign governments, the effect of which may be to
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"expropriate" the value of the investment. The expropriation need not be a
complete taking of the assets; it may consist of "creeping takings" through the
imposition of rules or the denial of privileges which have an adverse effect on
the value of the investment. The expropriation insurance, however. only covers
takings which are discriminatory or violative of the host country's laws or
international law. Therefore, OPIC insurance is not as broad as it might seem:
it does not cover the revocation of a necessary licence achieved through a
neutral rule applied for appropriate sovereign purposes [25]. Hence, an imposi-
tion of import restraints, as in the Occidental case, or a revocation of an export
licence, as in the Dresser case, would not be insured under OPIC since both
were applications of existing and presumably valid law.
3.2. Export-Import Bank and Federal Credit Insurance Association
While OPIC insures U.S. investors in foreign countries, the Ex-Im Bank
and its private-sector affiliate, the Federal Credit Insurance Association
(the "FCIA"), insure U.S. nationals who export merchandise made in the
United States. Like OPIC, Ex-Im is an off-budget agency of the U.S. Govern-
ment. The FCIA is an association of fifty private insurance companies that
underwrite Ex-Im's insurance program according to guidelines adopted by the
Bank.
The Ex-Im and FCIA programs are not limited, as are OPIC's by U.S.
foreign policy interests in less developed nations, since exports need not be
directed to LDCs to receive Ex-Im/FCIA insurance. However, like OPIC,
Ex-Im and FCIA insurance is not available for shipments to some countries.
especially those likely to be involved in countertrade. Ex-Im insurance does
not cover sales to countries denied most-favored-nation status [26]: nor is it
available for Communist countries, unless the President determines that in-
surance is in the national interest [27].
Ex-Im and FCIA insure against both political and commercial risks en-
countered in export sales or leases. This means that they will cover risks of
WRI, inconvertibility, and expropriation - risks that are of particular concern
to countertraders. These programs protect U.S. nationals against the risk of
government action, whether foreign or domestic. In particular, they insure
against revocation of required licences [28]. Because Ex-Im programs do not
cover transactions to those countries for which validated export licences are
generally required or for which licences have been revoked for political
reasons, the protection under the program has never been tested [29]. Neverthe-
less, its general scope is the kind needed to promote countertrade.
3.3. Agriculture and Food Act of 1981
In theory, the type of insurance proposed here has been authorized for
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certain agricultural exports. The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 [30]
contains a provision for compensating producers of agricultural commodities
that are subject to foreign policy or national security export controls. These
compensation provisions come into operation if: (1) the export controls affect
only agricultural goods and not all exports to the country of destination, and
(2) the exports of the particular commodity and the exports to the country of
destination exceed three percent of aggregate exports of that commodity to all
countries during the year prior to the one in which the restriction came into
effect.
When this provision applies, the Secretary of Agriculture is required to
make payments or loans to affected producers. The schedule of payments is set
at the difference between the parity price of the commodity and its average
market value during the 60-day period following the imposition of export
controls. The payment is not contingent upon specific export sales lost as a
result of the embargo; it is made to all affected producers of the commodity in
proportion to their sales to others during the period that the export control is
in effect. Producers pay no premium into the fund from which compensation is
paid out.
This measure was proposed by the Senate Agriculture Committee because of
its conviction that "action was necessary to protect [agricultural] producers
from the adverse effects of future agricultural trade suspensions imposed for
national security or foreign policy reasons" [31]. The Committee noted that it
is unfair to single out exporters of agricultural exports to "bear the burden of
embargoes" and suggested that this form of compensation might restrain
embargoes "in the first place" [32].
Identical arguments can be advanced by any of the individual firms or
industries that have conducted their business in reliance on the stability of
their government's trade policy. The insurance plan for countertrade proposed
here is not, however, a general program of compensation to all producers
without regard to the actual effect of an embargo upon them [33] nor a
program of payment without some prior contribution by its beneficiaries. The
model proposed in this article is rather an expanded version of the insurance
plan of the Ex-Im Bank.
4. An example: The Federal Republic of Germany
The need to protect the legitimate interests of exporters has been recognized
by other countries. Insurance for German businesses against governmental
interference in export sales is, for example, available through a program of the
Federal Republic of Germany. This program provides insurance against em-
bargoes on exports imposed by the West German Governement under its
Foreign Trade Law. In addition to embargoes, the Foreign Trade Law permits
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withdrawal of export licenses for reasons such as the "protection of national
security" or avoidance of "significant disturbance to the foreign relations" of
the Federal Republic [34]. However, it is unclear whether its drafters intended
a right to compensation for companies adversely affected by revocation of
export licences [35].
German legal literature suggests that an affected company should have a
right to compensation under the doctrine of eminent domain. In the Federal
Republic, the law of eminent domain requires that a property owner be
compensated when a governmental act directly imposes a "special sacrifice"
(Sonderopfer) not imposed on the public at large [36]. Generally, the require-
ments of statutes governing foreign trade are not regarded as imposing
"special sacrifices" on traders because the law anticipates the likelihood of
licence revocation and, therefore, provides advance notice that risks exist in
export trade [371. But it has been convincingly argued that these measures
actually affect only selected companies, those with contractual agreements,
and, therefore, they do impose a "special sacrifice" under the principle of
eminent domain [38].
The theory has not been tested because, through government sponsorship,
two West German companies [39] have been empowered to provide insurance
against the risk of embargo. The insurance covers losses resulting from the
imposition of export controls and the revocation of export licences by the West
German Government when government action is based on national security or
similar foreign policy grounds. Broad questions remain to be answered. It is,
for example, unclear whether this program will also cover export sanctions
imposed by directives or regulations of the European Economic Community
(the "EEC"). It seems appropriate to cover actions by the EEC since one of the
purposes of the EEC is to impose a common commercial policy for all member
states. On the other hand, it seems clear that import restraints imposed on
goods likely to be used in countertrade transactions in exchange for exports are
not covered by the West German plan.
5. Is insurance practical and feasible for this purpose?
An argument may be made that the proposed insurance is unnecessary
because countertrade is expanding. After all, there have been many counter-
trade agreements by U.S. firms, even in the absence of protection from the
actions of the U.S. Government that threaten payments. Nevertheless, despite
the willingness of exporters to take risks, the proposed insurance will be a
useful addition to trade policy if ways are needed to promote exports that do
not violate international accords on trade-distortive subsidies [40].
Three possible objections should be considered, however:
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5.1. The U.S. should not insure against a self-created risk
By sponsoring this form of insurance, the United States may be seen as
violating the general principle of the insurance trade that an insurer should not
insure against risks that it controls and creates.
But this principle has not hampered the operation of Ex-Im insurance for
exports to non-CMEA countries nor the protection provided agricultural
exports. Moreover, it should be viewed as inapplicable because the U.S.
Government need not be considered the party that both provides the insurance
and creates the risk. The insurance is to be provided by an off-budget,
semi-independent agency like the Ex-Im Bank or a private consortium like the
FCIA. Because decisions on insurance coverage and on export policy are not to
be made by the same parties, there is no identity of personality between the
insurance carrier and political agencies, such as the Office of Export Adminis-
tration, that act to revoke export licences. Indeed, it may be said that the
existence of insurance for U.S. parties will free political decision-makers to act
without concern for adverse effects on innocent traders [41].
5.2. The insurance may constitute an "export subsidy" proscribed by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Subsidies Code
Article 9(1) of the Subsidies Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (the "GATT"), to which the United States adheres, proscribes any grant
of "export subsidies" on industrial goods [42]. It may be argued that a U.S.
program to provide exporters with insurance against risks constitutes a sub-
sidy. However, a basic feature of the present proposal is that this coverage be
self-sustaining, like that provided by OPIC and Ex-Im. No federal funds would
be expended unless the operating agency were in default.
The pledge of the United States to guarantee the insurance obligation could
be regarded as subsidy, but so long as the premiums are calculated on the basis
of realistic assessments of risk and actually collected, no actual subsidy should
be found. According to the determination of the Commerce Department's
International Trade Administration in Certain Steel Products fiom Belgium
[43], only guaranty programs extended to "uncreditworthy" beneficiaries or
offered at noncommercial rates constitute subsidies. In an earlier decision,
Certain Iron Metal Castings fiom India, export credit insurance provided by a
government-created agency at commercial rates was held not to be a subsidy
within the meaning of the countervailing duty law [44).
5.3. An adequate remedy exists under U.S. law
The proposed insurance program may be regarded as an unnecessary
expenditure at a time when efforts are being made to reduce federal spending.
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It may be argued that a company whose export licence is revoked or which has
been prevented from receiving payment for a sale by an import limitation, has
suffered a taking of its property by the U.S. Governement for which just
compensation is required under the Fifth Amendment. The cause of action for
such compensation in the U.S. Claims Court may be regarded as an adequate
remedy.
No extensive study has been made of the question of whether a countertrade
participant whose agreement is frustrated by an export licence revocation or an
import limitation has a valid Fifth Amendment claim. No court has sustained
such a claim; a few have suggested that the claim would not be frivolous [45].
An analysis of recent Supreme Court decisions on the taking of an interest in
real property suggests that a right to compensation might be recognized in the
case of a company that had received a valid licence, produced goods to be
shipped, and then found the licence revoked for political reasons while the
goods awaited actual delivery [46]. The principle of government action and
government taking would seem equally to apply to the case of a single
adversely affected party suffering a reduction in the value of his property as it
would to the case of a chicken farmer prevented from continuing use of his
property because of military overflights [47].
Even if the courts are found to provide a remedy. the provision of insurance
may be a way of avoiding additional litigation in overcrowded courts and of
limiting the recovery against the government to amounts agreed upon in
advance and paid for, in part, by the insured party. It seems sensible to follow
the principles used in the management of commercial insurance where protec-
tion is financed by the premiums of all potential beneficiaries. A further virtue
of this approach is that taxpayers are spared the possible burden of at least
some successful claims for recovery against the government.
6. Conclusions
Although the insurance plan proposed in this article derives in part from
precedents in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. it
would break some new ground. Its practical virtues outweigh possible objec-
tions that are. to a large degree, based upon trade restrictions intended to
protect domestic manufacturers with little concern for the interest of U.S.
exporters.
The insurance program would assure a measure of fairness to U.S. exporters
whose activities pose problems for foreign policy. This form of insurance
would harmonize conflicts between current policies and laws. While the United
States often appears eager to encourage trade with East European countries as
a way of easing political tension and of establishing normal relations among
nations, it has enacted laws and regulations that limit trade with those
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countries when it harms the U.S. economy or when foreign policy dictates that
trade be used as an economic weapon. Unfortunately, the aperiodic use of that
weapon is likely to damage the business interests of U.S. exporters. The
proposed insurance would spread the risk of such injury rather than allowing it
to be concentrated upon the few firms that are involved in trade with the East.
It would also enable those firms to protect their interests through participation
in an insurance fund.
A number of issues remain to be explored before a final model of this
insurance scheme can be proposed. The parties eligible, the transactions to be
insured, the calculation of premiums, the amount to be recovered, and the
extent to which insurance provisions should bar Fifth Amendment claims are
questions that require additional discussion. Nevertheless, adoption of an
insurance plan will provide incentive to U.S. exporters and allow them to
compete more effectively against foreign exporters who benefit from more
expansive programs of government assistance.
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